Overconfident agents and evolving financial networks by de Lellis, Pietro et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Overconfident agents and evolving financial networks
Pietro DeLellis · Anna DiMeglio · Francesco Lo Iudice
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the impact of
agent personality on the complex dynamics taking place
in financial markets. Leveraging recent findings, we model
the artificial financial market as a complex evolving net-
work: we consider discrete dynamics for the node state
variables, which are updated at each trading session,
while the edge state variables, which define a network
of mutual influence, evolve continuously with time. This
evolution depends on the way the agents rank their
trading abilities in the network. By means of exten-
sive numerical simulations in selected scenarios, we shed
light on the role of overconfident agents in shaping the
emerging network topology, thus impacting on the over-
all market dynamics.
Keywords evolving networks · agent-based model ·
artificial financial market · complex networks
1 Introduction
The modern and contemporary economic history pro-
vides several of evidences that are in apparent contrad-
diction with the hypotheses of neoclassical economics
[4]. As examples, we mention some of the speculative
bubbles and market crushes that cannot be explained
with the neoclassical theory. In 1637, the first big spec-
ulative bubble of the history erupted, the Tulip bubble,
making the price of a bulb comparable with that of
houses, fields and livestocks [18], while, around 1720, in
the United Kingdom the overwhelming euphoria of the
investors fostered the South Sea Bubble which caused
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substantial losses even to Isaac Newton [31]. More re-
cently, the worldwide crises which followed the Wall
Street’s crush of 1929 represents a stunning example
of unpredicted and sudden market crush. The analysis
of these and of more recent historical events, (e.g. the
2008 financial crisis), seriously questioned the model of
the homo oeconomicus and convinced the economists of
the necessity of additional and interdisciplinary tools to
make quantitative the novel concepts coming from be-
havioral econonomics [1, 29]. This stimulated the con-
tributions of other disciplines, which include mathe-
matics, physics and different branches of engineering
[2, 14–17,21,30,32,34].
In particular, recent interdisciplinary works attempted
to connect the development of atomized behavioral mod-
els of the individual agent with that of the interaction
among them [9, 10, 19, 24, 33]. Moreover, empirical ev-
idence shows that agent behavior is influenced by the
time-varying cobweb of relationships they develop [28].
A pressing open problem is to shed light on the drivers
determining the evolution of the network. In the lit-
erature on social networks, a key element that shapes
the topology is the perceived difference among the net-
work agents, which depends on the way they rank them-
selves [3]. This is true, for instance, in the network of
scientific credits [25]. Similarly, in financial markets the
way agents rank their trading ability plays a key role
in determining the evolution of their social relation-
ships, as well in shaping their individual behavior [5,9].
However, agent perception of his trading ability is often
driven by psychological effects that lie outside rational-
ity. One of the best-known effects is overconfidence [8],
which is the attitude of an agent to strongly believe in
his mistaken valuations. These often leads to perform-
ing overoptimistic judgements of life prospects which
ultimately affect financial decisions. Overconfidence is
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associated with a body of related effects, which includes
overplacement, that is, overestimation of one’s rank in
a population. Clearly, this directly impacts on the as-
sessment of his own trading abilities compared to those
of his competing peers [22,23], and reflects on his trad-
ing patterns: overconfident agents tend to be stubborn
rather than open-minded [7].
In this paper, we extend a recently proposed evolv-
ing artificial financial market [9, 10] to model and test
the effect of overconfidence. The original model eluci-
dated the subtle interplay between agents’ behavior and
the evolving dynamics of the topology describing their
mutual influence. Exploiting our setting, we make one
step forward compared to the existing literature, and
evaluate not only the direct impact of overconfidence
on individual decision, but also the way this shapes the
network topology.
2 Reference market model
Following [9, 10], we model the financial market as an
evolving network of dynamical systems populated by a
set V = {1, . . . , n} of financial agents. At each trad-
ing session, an agent can decide whether investing a
fraction δ of his capital in one of the alternative finan-
cial portfolios from the finite set L = {1, ...,m} or not.
The m-th asset is a virtual asset, corresponding to no-
investment, which, differently from the other (proper)
investments, has unlimited availability. Every agent will
chose among one of the available portfolios depending
on his risk attitude ri(k). In turn, the risk attitude dy-
namics are described by
ri(k + 1) =

(1− w)ri(0) + w
νi(k)
n∑
h=1
ahi(k)rh(k),
if νi(k) > 0
ri(0) otherwise
(1)
for i = 1, . . . , n, where 0 < w < 1 is the interaction
weight, ri(0) is the innate risk attitude of agent i, ahi(k)
is 1 if agent i is influenced by agent h at time k, while
it is zero otherwise, and νi(k) =
∑
h ahi(k). In general,
ahi(k) can be viewed as the hi-th element of a time-
varying adjacency matrix A(k) describing the network
of mutual influences among the agents, and νi(k) the
cardinality of the set of influencers (the neighbors) of
agent i at time k.
At trading session k, the current risk attitude ri(k)
shapes the utility function that agent i seeks to max-
imize (see [9, 10] for further details), thus determining
the selection of the portfolio `i(k) := `i(ri(k)) in which
he invests a fraction δ of his capital. According to this
trading mechanism, the wealth dynamics will be then
given by
xi(k
− + 1) = xi(k) + βi(k)δxi(k)(a`i(k) − 1)
− (1− βi(k))δxi(k)(1− b`i(k)),
xi(k + 1) = τ(xi(k
− + 1)),
(2)
where a`i(k) and b`i(k) are the win and loss rates asso-
ciated to the selected portfolio `i(k), βi(k) a realization
of a uniform Bernoulli random variable describing the
output of the trade, and τ is a function describing the
taxation scheme regulating the market.
3 Modeling overconfidence
As explained above, an agent’s trading strategy is en-
tirely determined by his risk attitude. Therefore, in this
model, the level of confidence of an agent will be identi-
fied by his resistance to learn from the risk attitude (i.e.
trading strategy) of his neighbors. Equation (1) shows
that an agent’s risk attitude depends on his innate at-
titude and on the influence that the other agents may
have on him, described by the matrix A(k). Overconfi-
dence will be modelled by selecting an appropriate law
for updating A(k), which will take into account that
1. the interaction among the agents is selective, see
[26], and therefore agent i can be influenced by agent
h only if (h, i) ∈ Ea ⊂ V × V, with Ea being the set
of admissible edges;
2. the update will depend on the current wealth of the
agents, which is a measure that can objectively rank
the agents’ trading ability;
3. the update cannot be instantaneous, but has to be
dynamical;
4. the existence of an edge pointing to an agent, say i,
depends not on the objective ranking of i within his
neighbors, but on i’s perceived ranking.
To fulfill these four requirements, we exploit the edge
snapping mechanism [9, 11, 27] and associate to each
admissible edge (i, j) ∈ Ea (for all the others, aij(k) = 0
for all k) a state variable σij that can be viewed as a
mass moving in a double-well potential V , described by
σ¨ij(t) + µσ˙ij(t) +
dV (σij(t))
dσij(t)
= uji (t), (3)
where µ is a damping parameter, V (σij) := b(σij −
0.5)2(σij + 0.5)
2 is depicted in fig. 1, and
uji (t) = γ(t) max{0, γ(t)(xi(btc)/cj − xj(btc))}, (4)
where γ(t) = (−1)aij(btc) and cj is the self-confidence
of j, that is, a parameter quantifying the level of con-
fidence of agent j in his trading abilities. Accordingly,
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Fig. 1 Potential driving the edge evolution with b = 16. The
red dotted arrow corresponds to an inactive edge, while the
blue solid arrow to an active one.
each element of A(k) will be updated as follows:
aij(k) =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ Ea and σij(k) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(5)
To clarify how this mechanism works, for the sake of
clarity, we refer to the case of an agent j not being
influenced by agent i at time k (i.e. aij(k) = 0, σij(k) <
0), and having to decide whether he wants to account
for agent i’s risk attitude at time k+ 1, thus activating
the edge (i, j) (the case of a deactivation is specular).
In this case, eq. (4) becomes
uji (t) = max
(
0,
xi(k)
cj
− xj(k)
)
, t ∈ [k, k+ 1[. (6)
Indeed, in our mechanical analogy, when the mass is
closer to the first well (σij(k) < 0), then j is not in-
fluenced by i. To make j change his mind at the next
trading session, a necessary condition is that uij(t) > 0,
that is, he believes that i has better trading abilities
than his own. This happens when xi(k)/cj > xj(k).
Notice that a neutrally confident agent (cj = 1) just
compares his wealth with that of i, thus objectively
evaluating their relative past trading abilities. Differ-
ently, an overconfident agent (i.e. cj  1) will consider
being influenced by i only if agent i’s trading strategies
proved to be way more successful than that of agent j
(i.e. xi(k)  xj(k)). The opposite happens for under-
confident agents. However, we emphasize that those are
only necessary conditions for activating the edge: as the
update is not instantaneous, but dynamical according
to equation (3), the perceived difference in trading abil-
ities has to be intense enough and persist for a sufficient
time span.
4 Numerical analysis
4.1 Setup
We have considered an artificial market populated by
n = 1000 agents that can choose to invest in one of three
alternative portfolios. As in [10], the agents are grouped
in three classes (of equal size) depending on their innate
risk attitudes that are uniformly distributed in the in-
terval [0.5, 1]. Namely, they are classified as audacious if
ri0 ∈ [0.83, 1], ordinary if ri0 ∈ [0.67, 0.83), and prudent
otherwise. The choice of the risk attitudes for the three
classes is such that the prudent agents will only con-
sider investing in the less risky portfolio, the ordinary
will consider also the averagely risky portfolio, while
the audacious agents will also invest in the riskiest one.
Moreover, the market is regulated by a Tobin-like taxa-
tion scheme, which defines the function τ in (2), see [10]
for further details. This scheme was shown to favor pru-
dent agents, as it reduces the wealth of the winning
agents and redistributes the tax revenues to the other
agents, and keeps unchanged the average wealth [10].
Within this main frame, we aimed at testing the ef-
fect of overconfidence on the overall market dynamics,
with a special focus on the properties of the emerging
network. In what follows, we call an agent overconfi-
dent when his self-confidence is greater than a certain
threshold c¯. In formal terms
O = {i : ci > c¯} .
where O is the set of overconfident agents. In our sim-
ulations, we set c¯ = 2.5. To test the effect of overconfi-
dence, we selected two reference scenarios:
a) All the agents are neutrally confident, that is, ci = 1
for all i. In this case, the agents are perfectly ratio-
nal, and they rank their trading ability by only con-
sidering the output of their past investments, that
is, their wealth.
b) The agents mildly deviate from rationality, as ci are
randomly selected from an inverse uniform distribu-
tion with median 1, where the overconfident agents
represent a minority in the market.
These reference scenarios are compared with cases in
which the overconfident are prevalent, as often occurs
in real markets [20]. In particular, we consider
c) An extremely overconfident market, in which all the
agents are overconfident, as we selected the coeffi-
cients ci, i = 1, . . . , n, from an inverse uniform dis-
tribution with values in [2.5,∞).
d) A prevalently overconfident market, in which, for
each class of agents (audacious, ordinary, and pru-
dent), half of the agents are selected as in Scenario
b) and half as in c).
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In our analysis, we have run 100 simulations for each
of the four scenarios, where all the agents start with
the same initial wealth. Before the interaction is trig-
gered, the agents trade without mutual influence for
1000 sessions to diversify their wealth xj , j = 1, . . . , n.
Then, we generate the edge set E0 of an Erdo¨s and Re´nyi
(ER) graph [12] with average degree dave = 52. At time
k = 1001 the snapping dynamics (3) are activated for
all the pair of nodes (i, j) ∈ E0, and we let the market
evolve for further 14000 sessions, so that a steady-state
wealth distribution is achieved and that the network
parameters analyzed in the following section settle.
4.2 Results
In what follows, we first investigate how overconfidence
shapes the network of influence among the agents, and
then analyze the subsequent effect on the risk attitude
and wealth of the agents.
How does overconfidence shape the network?
The considered scenarios differ for both the percent-
age of overconfident, and for the variability of the self-
confidence, which could be quantified by the sample
standard deviation. In what follows, we aim at elucidat-
ing how these reflects on the network properties, with
a specific focus on
– the network density, quantified by its average degree
dave.
– the network asymmetry, that determines the direc-
tionality of the relations in the influence network,
and that, following [6], we quantify through the ab-
solute binary network asymmetry as
sb =
1
2
N + 1
N − 1
(∥∥A−AT∥∥
F
‖A‖F
)2
,
where ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm. Notice that sb
spans from 0, that is the case of an undirected net-
work, to 1, which corresponds to the case where
there are no mutual links, i.e. the activation of edge
(i, j) implies the absence of (j, i).
– the network clustering, that is quantified by the av-
erage clustering coefficient C. We remind that the
clustering coefficient of a node, say i, is computed
as the ratio between the number of directed trian-
gles in the graph and the total number of possible
triangles that i could form;
– correlation between degree distribution and wealth,
quantified through the computation of the correla-
tion ρ(x, do) between the wealth of an agent and his
out-degree.
Table 1 Legend. dave is the average degree of the network;
sb is the asolute binary network asymmetry; C and Cr are the
clustering coefficient of the network and of the corresponding
ER graph with equivalent degree, respectively; ρ(x, do) is the
correlation between the wealth of an agent and his out-degree,
Co, Cm, Ci, and Co are the number of cycle, middleman, in,
and out pattern over the total number of possible triangles,
respectively; |O| /n and |U| /n are the fraction of overcon-
fidence and underconfident agents, respectively. Confidence
intervals with significance level 0.05 are also reported when
needed.
Scen. (a) (b) (c) (d)
dave 26.00 23.46 5.50 14.40
[25.61, 26.39] [22.87, 24.05] [4.95, 6.05] [13.87, 14.93]
sb 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.91
[0.98, 1.00] [0.78, 0.81] [0.98, 1.00] [0.90, 0.92]
103C 25.80 28.10 4.18 24.10
[25.59, 26.01] [27.56, 28.64] [3.57, 4.79] [23.28, 24.92]
103Cc 0.07 0.85 0 0.19
[0.05, 0.09] [0.75, 0.95] [0, 0] [0.16, 0.22]
103Cm 8.58 8.86 1.50 8.11
[8.51, 8.65] [8.74, 8.98] [1.19, 1.81] [7.84, 8.38]
103Ci 8.58 6.50 2.53 4.05
[8.51, 8.65] [6.38, 6.62] [1.98, 3.08] [3.87, 4.23]
103Co 8.58 11.85 0.15 11.75
[8.51, 8.65] [11.43, 12.27] [0.13, 0.17] [11.02, 12.48]
103Cr 26.05 23.51 5.51 14.28
ρ(x, do) 0.41 0.51 0.71 0.62
[0.39, 0.43] [0.49, 0.54] [0.69, 0.73] [0.60, 0.64]
|O|/n 0 0.22 1.00 0.62
|U|/n 0 0.20 0 0.10
The effects of the different distribution of self-confidence
are summarized in Table 1 and discussed below. The
first immediate consequence of overconfidence is an in-
creased sparsity of the network. Indeed, the abnormal
level of self-confidence makes the agent reluctant to be
influenced by their neighbors. Consistently, we observed
a dramatic reduction of the average degree dave as the
fraction of overconfident agents increases. Indeed, when
all the agents are overconfident (Scenario (c)), given the
pair of edges (i, j), (j, i) ∈ Ea with agent i richer than
j, it clearly happens that i will decide not to be influ-
enced by j, but also (more irrationally), agent j will
often let aij = 0. This behavior produces a sparse net-
work, populated by stubborn investors, but the network
remains perfectly asymmetric, with sb being equal to 1
as in the Scenario (a). Consistently, we observe that the
presence of bidirectional links is caused by the presence
of a set of agent U with an opposite behavior, that is,
the underconfident, that in our simulations we define as
U = {i : ci < 0.65} .
Underconfident agents overestimate the trading abil-
ities of their neighbors, thus considering being influ-
enced also by less successful investors: this leads to an
increased probability of the presence of mutual links,
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Fig. 2 Example of the four possible patterns in triangles
from the perspective of node i [13]: cycle (i), middleman (ii),
in (iii), and out (iv).
and therefore to the reduction of sb as the fraction of
underconfident increases.
As for the clustering coefficient C, we observed that,
when the agents behave homogeneously, it is always
of the same magnitude as the expected one in an ER
random graph with the same size and expected degree.
This happens in Scenarios (a) and (c), where the agents
are all rational or all overconfident, respectively. On the
contrary, the increased heterogeneity of the agent be-
haviors in Scenarios (b) and (d) increases the likelihood
of encountering triangles of agents, see Table 1. How-
ever, the differences becomes even more relevant if we
decompose the overall clustering coefficient in the four
possible patterns that can be formed in directed net-
works, see Fig. 2. The absence of underconfident agents
in Scenarios (a) and (c) makes almost impossible the
formation of cycles, which instead appear in (b) and are
significantly higher in (d), which is the scenario char-
acterized by the highest fraction |U| /n of underconfi-
dent. Moreover, we notice that in a market dominated
by overconfidence as in Scenario (c), the possibility of
having (at least) two outgoing edges is limited only to
the richest agents, that may influence those who are sig-
nificantly poorer overcoming their overconfidence: con-
sequently, this strongly reduces the fraction of out pat-
terns Co, which are instead favored in Scenarios (b)
and (d), where the underconfidence of a non-negligible
minority of agents increases the chances of having out
patterns.
Finally, we observe the correlation between outde-
gree and wealth. Intuition would suggest this correla-
tion to be higher in a rational market, where the richer
are more likely to have a higher out-going degree. Sur-
prisingly, we observe that the ρ increases as long as
the fraction of overconfident agents increases. The ex-
planation is that in a market populated by overconfi-
dent agents, agent i may have outgoing edges only if
his wealth is much higher than that of his neighbors,
thus increasing the correlation between out-degree and
wealth.
How does overconfidence impact on agent success?
The different distribution of self-confidence in the four
considered scenarios shapes the network topology which,
in turns, affects the way agents’ trade through equa-
tion (1). From [9, 10], we know that in a rational mar-
ket the Tobin-like tax regulating the market favors the
prudent agents, that consider investing only in the less
risky asset. Therefore, prudent agents have in average
more outgoing links, and therefore the average risk at-
titude r¯ settles around 0.67, see the blue line in Fig.
3, which is significantly lower than the average innate
attitude of the agents, that is 0.75. An interesting ef-
fect is observed as the fraction of overconfident agents
pervades the market: the average risk attitude further
reduces, see Fig. 3 when all the agents are overconfi-
dent (red line) we observe the lowest settling value for
r¯(k). This is explained by the fact that overconfident
agents are only influenced by the agents who are signif-
icantly richer than them: this means that an overcon-
fident agent i is very likely to only imitate the trading
patterns of the agents with the best strategy, and not
of agents with wrong strategy, but that are temporary
richer than i due to a better luck.
Now, we focus on Scenario (d) to understand whether
overconfidence hinders agent’s wealth. To this aim, we
evaluated the average wealth for each class of agents
(prudent, ordinary, and audacious) and checked whether
being overconfident were an advantage or not in each
class, see Fig. 4. In agreement with the findings of be-
havioral finance [20–23], we find that an excess of con-
fidence is detrimental when agents’ own valuations are
mistaken: in this case, being open-minded can make
up for wrong evaluations. On the other hand, skilled
traders benefit from self-confidence, as they stand on
their own correct evaluations.
5 Conclusions
Overconfidence is a well-know psychological effect that
biases decision making in trading. In this paper, we in-
vestigated its impact on an artificial financial market
recently proposed in [9, 10], which is characterized by
the coevolution of the agents’ state, in terms of risk
attitude and wealth, with the network of mutual influ-
ence among them. In particular, we analyzed the way
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Fig. 3 Evolution of the average risk attitude r¯(k) in Sce-
nario (a) (blue line), (b) (green line), (c) (red line), and (d)
(magenta line).
1000 4000 8000 12000 16000
k
0
50
100
150
200
x¯
j
(k
)
Fig. 4 Scenario (d). Evolution of the average risk attitude.
Blue, green, and orange lines, correspond to prudent, ordi-
nary and audacious agents, respectively, while solid and dot-
ted lines refer to overconfident and non-overconfident agents,
respectively.
the distribution of self-confidence shapes the network
topology through extensive numerical simulations. In
particular, we observed that
– overconfidence fosters network sparsity: agents tend
to become stubborn rather than open-minded, thus
reducing the connections with their neighbors;
– networks pervaded by overconfident agents are strongly
asymmetric, as underconfident (and rich) agents are
crucial for the formation of mutual influence among
pairs of agents;
– a more heterogeneous distribution favors clustering.
The presence both underconfident and overconfi-
dent agents promotes the emergence of triangle mo-
tifs and, more specifically, allows the for the pres-
ence of cycles;
– a highly overconfident market is characterized by a
stronger correlation between out-degree and wealth:
indeed, only the richest agents are capable of influ-
encing stubborn overconfident agents.
Also, we observed that the average risk attitude reduces
as the fraction of overconfidence increases: indeed, over-
confidence is accompanied by a more selective coupling
which implies that most of the influence links depart
from edges having the best (prudent) trading strategy.
However, we numerically illustrated that overconfidence
is indeed detrimental when it has the effect of sticking
the agent on his own mistaken valuation.
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